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Over the last several decades, the United States government has 
expanded self-governance opportunities for Native American tribes, 
reflecting the recognition that self-governance is a fundamental 
sovereign function. This development in federal policy has been 
implemented in several different ways, but the two primary 
approaches can be found in the Tribal Self-Governance Act (TSGA) 
and the “Treatment as State” (TAS) amendments of several 
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environmental statutes. This Article examines the potential 
application of these two approaches toward transfer of authority to 
tribes under the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA), which 
explicitly contemplates the transfer of management authority to 
states, but not to tribes. This Article ultimately concludes that an 
integrated approach, combining elements of both strategies, would 
be the most effective solution.  
In the Marine Mammal Commission’s (MMC) 2008 report, the 
following recommendation was made: “[t]o prevent depletion of 
subsistence species, ANOs [Alaska Native Organizations], the 
IPCoMM [Indigenous People’s Council for Marine Mammals], and 
federal agency partners should continue to advocate for amendments 
to the MMPA that would authorize co-management partners to 
adopt enforceable harvest limits in appropriate circumstances.”1 
Similarly, the Alaska Federation of Natives (AFN) has proposed 
changes to the MMPA in order to strengthen the Alaska Native co-
management role.2 In a 2008 list of priorities, the Alaska Federation 
of Natives included a desire to see greater authority for tribes “to 
regulate the subsistence take of marine mammals.”3 Essentially, 
MMC, AFN, and others suggest that Tribes be given at least a 
portion of the authority that the MMPA contemplates giving to 
states—delegated management authority over marine mammals—
particularly in relation to harvest and conservation regimes.4 The 
                                                                                                         
1 Marine Mammal Commission, Review of Co-Management Efforts in Alaska, 
MMC 15 (2008), http://www.mmc.gov/wp-content/uploads/mmc_comgmt.pdf. 
2 Alaska Federation of Natives, 2012 Annual Convention Food Security and 
Management of Subsistence Resources Action Plan, NATIVE FEDERATION 2 
(Nov. 11, 2012), http://www.nativefederation.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/03/Food-Security-Action-Plan-as-amended-112012.pdf. 
3 Alaska Federation of Natives, 2008 Federal Priorities: Protection of 
Subsistence Hunting, Fishing and Gathering in Alaska, NATIVE FEDERATION 5–
6 (2008), www.nativefederation.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/2008-afn-
federal-priorities.pdf. To that end, AFN has worked with IPCoMM, Marine 
Mammal Commission, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), and National 
Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) to develop a package of MMPA amendments. 
See also Alaska Federation of Natives, Alaska Native Priorities for 2012-2013 
Presidential and Congressional Transition, NATIVE FEDERATION 7–8 (Dec. 
2012), http://www.nativefederation.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/10/AFN_TransitionWhitePaper_121912.pdf. 
4 Additionally, “NOAA Fisheries, FWS, the Marine Mammal Commission, and 
Alaska Native Groups have recommended that the provisions for development 
and implementation of co-management regimes be expanded in the MMPA to 
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next step in the evolution of tribal self-governance may be the 
application of these principles to the MMPA. Because the State of 
Alaska cannot take over management control under the MMPA,5 
and Alaska Natives have such a close and statutorily protected 
connection to marine mammals, Alaska provides an excellent case 
study to test this theory.  
Section 109 of the MMPA gives states the opportunity to apply 
to the federal government for management jurisdiction under the 
statute.6 If the federal government approves the transfer of authority, 
then the state becomes the primary management authority for 
marine mammals within that state’s boundaries. This increases the 
level of access and input each state’s citizens have in the marine 
mammal management process and may make it more likely that 
management takes into account local cultural norms, needs, and 
concerns. However, in Alaska, where marine mammals are 
particularly vital to Alaska Natives on the coast for economic, 
cultural, and subsistence purposes, management authority cannot 
devolve to the state. And while co-management opportunities for 
Alaska Natives exist, these opportunities are still more limited than 
those a state would receive, even though recognized Tribes are 
considered quasi-sovereigns, as states are.7  
The MMPA, furthermore, is intended by design to have 
management authority devolve to a more local level of government 
(states) where possible, though that is not happening (and in the case 
of Alaska cannot happen). Several articles argue that Native 
Americans have inherent legal authority to manage or co-manage 
wildlife and other public resources based on reserved treaty rights 
                                                                                                         
make them binding on subsistence hunters” since currently compliance with 
harvest limits set by cooperative agreements is voluntary. Donna Christie, Living 
Marine Resources Management: A Proposal for Integration of United States 
Management Regimes, 34 ENVTL. L. 107, 163 (2004).  
5 This point will be fully explored in Part II of this Article.  
6 16 U.S.C.A § 1379 (West 2016). 
7 “[T]ribal governments are sovereign and have inherent powers of self-
government. For this reason, there is a unique government-to-government 
relationship between federally-recognized tribes and the federal government.” 
Martin Nie, The Use of Co-Management and Protected Land-Use Designations 
to Protect Tribal Cultural Resources and Reserved Treaty Rights on Federal 
Lands, 48 NAT. RESOURCES J. 585, 594 (2008).  
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in those resources.8 However, Alaska Natives, for the most part, did 
not sign treaties with the federal government.9 The central statute 
defining Alaska Native land rights, the Alaska Native Claims 
Settlement Act, extinguished all indigenous hunting and fishing 
rights,10 so theories based on reserved treaty rights cannot apply in 
Alaska.11  
Native American tribes have received TAS authority from the 
federal government under the auspices of other statutes. “Alaska 
native villages are tribes in the political sense of that term and are 
similar in all significant respects to the tribes of the contiguous 
forty-eight states.”12 Since the State of Alaska cannot be given 
management authority, and therefore protect the interests of its 
citizens, could Alaska Native Tribes be given TAS authority instead 
and take over MMPA management directly?  Alternatively, in the 
absence of the congressional action needed to achieve TAS, could 
the existing principles of the TSGA provide expanded MMPA 
management opportunities for tribes, at least with respect to species 
managed by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS)? This Article 
attempts to answer these questions.  
Part I of this Article explains why the State of Alaska cannot 
currently assume management over the MMPA. This Part also lays 
out the differences between co-management authority, which the 
MMPA already grants to Native groups, and transfer authority, 
which the statute currently only makes available to state 
governments. Part II describes the “Treatment as State” approach 
that has been applied to other statutory schemes in order to allow 
                                                                                                         
8 See, e.g., Mary Ann King, Co-Management or Contracting? Agreements 
Between Native American Tribes and the U.S. National Park Service Pursuant 
to the 1994 Tribal Self-Governance Act, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 475 (2007); 
Ed Goodman, Protecting Habitat for Off-Reservation Tribal Hunting and 
Fishing Rights: Tribal Co-Management as a Reserved Right, 30 ENVTL. L. 279 
(2000); and Mary Christina Wood, The Tribal Property Right to Wildlife Capital 
(Part I): Applying Principles of Sovereignty to Protect Imperiled Wildlife 
Populations, 37 IDAHO L. REV. 1 (2000). 
9 Two exceptions are Venetie, whose original treaty and reservation were 
revoked by the passage of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, and 
Metlakatla, which is the only remaining reservation in Alaska. See DAVID CASE 
& DAVID VOLUCK, ALASKA NATIVES AND AMERICAN LAWS 96 (2d ed. 2002). 
10 43 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (2006). 
11 Elizabeth Barret Ristroph, Alaska Tribe’s Melting Subsistence Rights, 1 ARIZ. 
J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 47, 67 (2010).  
12 CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 9, at 384. 
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tribes to assume the same rights and responsibilities already 
accorded to states under those laws. This part explains how TAS 
could be applied under the MMPA and what the drawbacks of this 
approach are. Part III describes the TSGA approach to transferring 
authority over federal programs to tribes. This Part also describes 
how such an approach might work under the MMPA, and what the 
drawbacks of this approach are likely to be. Part IV provides an 
integrated solution to tribal assumption of power under the MMPA 
by drawing on the most useful pieces of the TAS provisions and the 
TSGA to create a new approach to this type of federal-tribal power 
sharing arrangement. This Part also presents how the Nez Perce 
Tribe was successfully given off-reservation authority to manage 
wildlife. Finally, Part IV concludes that the integrated approach 
solves the present deadlock in the most complete manner, without 
creating additional difficulties as the other approaches singly may 
do.  
 
I. UNDERLYING ISSUES 
 
A. Why Can’t Alaska Assume Management Authority under  
the MMPA? 
The Alaska State constitution conflicts with certain aspects of 
the MMPA; therefore, the state is barred from implementing that 
statute. The MMPA permits “any Indian, Aleut or Eskimo who 
dwells on the coast of the North Pacific Ocean or the Arctic Ocean” 
to take marine mammals for “subsistence purposes.”13 In a 1979 
court case, Togiak v. United States,14 the court determined that the 
Native exemption to the marine mammal harvest ban in the MMPA, 
which allows Alaska Natives to continue to harvest marine 
mammals under certain conditions, was an exercise of the United 
States’ trust responsibilities to Native Americans, “and an 
abandonment of those responsibilities should not be lightly 
presumed.”15 This decision forestalled a planned return of 
management authority over walrus to the State of Alaska, because 
                                                                                                         
13 16 U.S.C. § 1371(b) (2003). 
14 Togiak v. United States, 470 F. Supp. 423 (D.D.C. 1979). 
15 Id. at 428. 
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some of the State’s planned regulations would have “had the effect 
of prohibiting Native walrus hunting in some areas.”16 In 1981, 
amendments to the MMPA would again have allowed the state to 
assume jurisdiction over marine mammals as long as the state 
protected rural Alaskans’ subsistence rights to harvest marine 
mammals.17  
Unfortunately, the State is barred by its constitution, which 
requires equal access to natural resources and forbids residency-
based subsistence preferences, from implementing rural subsistence 
hunting programs.18 When the state returned management authority 
over walrus back to the federal government in 1979, the State made 
it clear that it would not pursue further transfers of authority under 
the MMPA.19 Since the State cannot implement the MMPA’s Native 
harvest provisions, it cannot retain management authority of marine 
mammals under the present statute unless and until the state’s 
constitution is amended. There have been at least two major 
efforts—in 1990 and 199220—to amend Alaska’s constitution to 
correct this conflict with federal law,21 but all efforts have failed.22 
To date, no state has been given MMPA authority over any marine 
mammal species.23  
 
 
                                                                                                         
16 CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 9, at 279. 
17 16 U.S.C.A. § 1379(f) (West 2016). 
18 McDowell v. Alaska, 785 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1989).  
19 MICHAEL BEAN & MELANIE ROWLAND, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL 
WILDLIFE LAW 145 (3d. ed. 1997); Marine Mammals; Suspension of Hunting 
and Killing of Walrus under the 1976 Waiver of the Moratorium, 44 Fed. Reg. 
45,565 (Aug. 2, 1979). 
20 Alaska Humanities Forum, Modern Alaska–Subsistence, AK HISTORY 
COURSE, www.akhistorycourse.org/articles/article.php?artID=259 (last visited 
May 12, 2016). See also CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 9, at 273 n.102.  
21 The state finds itself out of compliance not only with the dictates of the 
MMPA, but with the Alaska National Interests Lands Conservation Act as well, 
which also mandates a rural subsistence preference. 16 U.S.C. § 3114 (1998). 
See also CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 9, at 294–302. 
22 CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 9, at 273 n.102 (stating that “it has proven 
politically impossible to amend the Alaska Constitution to permit residency-
based subsistence preferences required under federal law”). 
23 Donald C. Baur, Michael L. Gosliner & Nina M. Young, The Law of Marine 
Mammal Conservation, in OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW AND POLICY 484 (Donald 
C. Baur et al. eds., 2008). 
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B. Native Co-Management v. Transfer Authority under the MMPA 
In order to determine what changes are needed in the current 
approach to MMPA implementation, it must first be understood 
what management authority the MMPA already grants to Alaska 
Natives. Section 119 of the MMPA authorizes the federal 
government to enter into cooperative or co-management 
arrangements with Alaska Native groups. However, these 
agreements are statutorily limited to areas of conservation and 
subsistence use and contemplate no other area of marine mammal 
management.24 Furthermore, funding for these arrangements is 
limited to collecting and analyzing population data, monitoring 
harvests, participating in research, and developing co-management 
structures.25 Therefore, these agreements are largely limited to 
sharing authority over subsistence use and data collection. For 
example, the FWS has entered into co-management agreements with 
Native entities, including the Eskimo Walrus Commission (EWC).26 
“But while FWS has cooperated with EWC in terms of funding, 
monitoring, and outreach, there has been no real transfer of authority 
to EWC. FWS continues to conduct its own law enforcement, and 
the two entities have separate goals regarding walrus 
conservation.”27  
Federal agencies are naturally reluctant to voluntarily share or 
delegate their regulatory authority. As a result, there is an 
assumption that the agencies will manage while the tribes will 
cooperate, “with relatively little power granted to Native Tribes or 
organizations.”28 On the other hand,  Section 109 of the MMPA 
                                                                                                         
24 16 U.S.C. § 1388(a) (2016). 
25 16 U.S.C. § 1388(b) (2016). 
26 See Marine Mammal Commission, Co-Management and Alaska Native Tribal 
Consultation, MMC, http://www.mmc.gov/priority-topics/arctic/co-
management-and-alaska-native-tribal-consultation/ (last visited May 11, 2016). 
27 Ristroph, supra note 11, at 75. 
28 Honorable Eric Smith, Some Thoughts on Comanangement, 4 HASTINGS W.-
N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 8 (Summer 1997). One exception may be the 
cooperative agreement between the Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission and 
NOAA Fisheries. This agreement often held up as a model which gives the 
Native organization an unusual amount of authority, however, even though “the 
AEWC co-management agreement contains provisions for regulation, research 
and enforcement, the AEWC clearly does not have equal management authority 
for the bowhead [whale]. The management powers of the AEWC are limited by 
the fact that it cannot set the quotas itself, nor is the AEWC a formal participant 
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authorizes the federal government to transfer management authority, 
for the “conservation and management” of marine mammal species, 
to the states if certain criteria are met.29 This power-sharing 
arrangement is much more demanding of the receiving state, but 
also provides a much greater breadth of authority. The statute states 
that “[t]he Secretary may delegate to a state the ‘administration and 
enforcement’ of the MMPA,”30 but “[t]he MMPA does not define 
the term “administration,” which arguably could include any of the 
Secretary’s duties.”31 While the native co-management arrangement 
provides Alaskan Natives with an important opportunity, it does not 
provide an opportunity for management of all the variables affecting 
marine mammal populations and the effect of subsistence harvest.  
It is also worth noting that Native subsistence harvest activities 
are unregulated by the federal government unless the species in 
                                                                                                         
in the process of quota setting by the International Whaling Commission.” 
Jennifer L. Schorr, The Integration of Traditional Ecological Knowledge and 
Science Under Marine Mammal Protection Act Co-Management Agreements 27 
(1998) (unpublished Master’s thesis, University of Washington) (on file with the 
University of Washington Library). Furthermore, it is widely recognized that the 
AEWC was only able to secure so much authority for itself because it secured 
the co-management agreement under § 112 of the MMPA. 16 U.S.C. § 1382(c) 
(2016). § 112 provides the opportunity for greater authority than § 119 but 
agencies have become very reluctant to employ §112 and generally default to § 
119 rather than the more commonly used § 119, and because it is also operating 
under the auspices of the International Convention for the Regulation of 
Whaling and Whaling Convention Act. Interview with Jessica Lefevre, counsel 
for the Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission, Lefevre Law (July 30, 2015); see 
also Jessica Lefevre, A Pioneering Effort in the Design Process and Law 
Supporting Integrated Arctic Ocean Management, 43 ENVTL. L. REP. 10893, 
10894 (Oct. 2013). Finally, the difference can also be attributed to the fact that 
the AEWC is unusually well-funded through support from the North Slope 
Borough, which is supported by tax revenues from the Prudhoe Bay oil fields, a 
revenue source not available to other groups. . Interview with Jessica Lefevre, 
counsel for the Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission, Lefevre Law (July 30, 
2015); see also Jessica Lefevre, A Pioneering Effort in the Design Process and 
Law Supporting Integrated Arctic Ocean Management, 43 ENVTL. L. REP. 
10893, 10895 (Oct. 2013). 
29 16 U.S.C. § 1379 (2016). The terms “conservation” and “management” are 
not defined by the statute in this context but are also not limited only to the area 
of subsistence use as they are in § 119. 
30 16 U.S.C. § 1379(k) (2016). 
31 BEAN & ROWLAND, supra note 19, at 143–44. As the authors state, there are 
some express limitations found elsewhere in the statute. Id. at 146; see also 16 
U.S.C. §§ 1379(b)(3)(B)(i)–(ii), (d)(1) (2016). 
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question is listed as “depleted” under the MMPA,32 or “threatened” 
or “endangered” under the Endangered Species Act.33 However, 
tribes play a small role in the federal government’s decision making 
process regarding whether to limit subsistence if or when marine 
mammal populations decline.34 Co-management authority as it 
currently exists under the MMPA, while an important and useful 
tool, is not comparable to the level of control provided for by the 
transfer of authority to state provision of the statute; it could be 
significantly expanded. 
 
C. Importance of Subsistence for Alaskan Natives 
David Case wrote that the term subsistence stands for the 
“traditional Alaska Native way of life” and therefore “the ability of 
Alaska Natives to maintain subsistence as a way of life is a measure 
of their ability to achieve self-determination.”35 Promoting Indian 
self-determination has been a goal of federal Indian policy since the 
Nixon administration.36 Alaska Native cultural and nutritional needs 
are inextricably linked to subsistence harvest; this is particularly true 
for remote Arctic communities dependent on marine mammals.37 
“[A]dverse impacts to subsistence resources can affect the social 
and nutritional health of thousands of indigenous people residing in 
Arctic Alaska.”38 Protecting subsistence and Native control over 
subsistence contributes to the achievement of Indian self-
determination.  
                                                                                                         
32 16 U.S.C. § 1371(b) (2003). 
33 16 U.S.C. § 1539(e) (2016). 
34 Ristroph, supra note 11, at 71. 
35 David S. Case, Subsistence and Self-determination: Can Alaska Natives Have 
a more “Effective Voice”?, 60 COLO. L. REV. 1009, 1010 (1989). 
36 See id. at 1010; see also Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance 
Act of 1975, 25 U.S.C. §§ 450–58 (2016); Tribal Self Governance Act of 1994, 
25 U.S.C. §§ 458aa–58hh (2014); Exec. Order No. 13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249 
(Nov. 9, 2000); Memorandum from President Barack Obama for the Heads of 
Executive Dep’ts and Agencies on Tribal Consultation (Nov. 5, 2009). available 
at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/memorandum-tribal-
consultation-signed-president. 
37 Jessica Lefevre, A Pioneering Effort in the Design Process and Law 
Supporting Integrated Arctic Ocean Management, 43 ENVTL. L. REP. 10893, 
10894 (Oct. 2013). 
38 Id. 
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Marine mammal populations are threatened by climate change, 
off-shore oil and gas exploration and development, shipping 
activity, naval exercises, the cruise ship industry, and incidental take 
by commercial fishing operations. Congress has expressly 
recognized the importance of marine mammals to Alaskan Native 
communities several times.39 Yet, Alaska Natives who depend upon 
marine mammals for sustenance and cultural identity have little 
significant control over their management. Giving primary 
management and enforcement authority to the local community is 
often beneficial since community pressure can be more effective in 
achieving compliance than government enforcement.40 As 
sovereign entities, and ones with unique cultural and essential 
subsistence connections to the resource, Alaska Native Tribes 
should be given a similar opportunity as the states to accept 
responsibility to manage these resources, particularly in Alaska 
where there would be no possibility of conflict with state 
management.  
 
II. LEGAL APPROACH #1: TAS AUTHORITY 
“Treatment as State,” whereby Congress decides to treat tribal 
entities as equivalent to states for the purposes of implementing and 
managing certain federal programs, is not a new concept. Congress 
has amended several statutes to include TAS authority, so that tribes 
can attain regulatory primacy, receive federal grant funding, and be 
consulted and informed as appropriate.41 The Indian Self-
Determination Act defines “Indian tribe” in part to include “any 
Alaska Native village or regional or village corporations as defined 
in or established” under Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act.42 
“Most major federal environmental laws operate on a principle of 
                                                                                                         
39 ANILCA states that “the opportunity for subsistence uses by rural residents of 
Alaska . . . is essential to Native physical, economic, traditional, and cultural 
existence.” 16 U.S.C. § 3111(1) (2014). Similarly, the MMPA states that one 
duty of the Marine Mammal Commission is to make recommendations “for the 
protection of the Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts whose livelihoods may be 
adversely affected by actions taken pursuant to this Act.” 16 U.S.C. § 1402(a)(7) 
(2016). 
40 Schorr, supra note 28, at 32. 
41 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d)(1)(A) (2016); 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (2014); 24 
U.S.C. § 300j–11 (2014); 42 U.S.C. § 9626 (2016). 
42 25 U.S.C. § 450b(e) (2016).  
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cooperative federalism.”43 Federal statutes establish minimum 
national standards and encourage states to apply for “primacy”—
that is primary regulatory authority—to implement those standards 
within state borders.44 Many environmental laws have been adapted 
to allow tribes a similar authority. “Tribal self-determination 
persists as the official federal policy and is a central underpinning 
for Congress’ recent amendment to the federal environmental 
regulatory programs on a similar basis to states.”45 Amending the 
statute to include a TAS provision would be the most direct way to 
grant Alaska Natives management authority over marine mammals, 
comparable to what a state is entitled to under existing MMPA 
provisions. 
 
A. A Brief History of TAS Authority 
Most federal environmental laws contain mechanisms through 
which authority under the statute can devolve from the federal 
government (usually the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)) 
to the state. This cooperative federalism arrangement allows 
environmental laws to be tailored to local environmental, political, 
and/or economic conditions; gives local levels of government more 
control over local risks and benefits; and increases the opportunity 
of input by local citizens. States have been taking advantage of these 
opportunities since the 1960s.  
In 1984, the EPA adopted regulations recognizing tribes as 
“sovereign entities with primary authority and responsibility for the 
reservation populace.”46 EPA policy at that time was to assume that 
tribal governments had the authority to set standards and manage 
environmental programs on reservations.47 This approach was 
challenged in Backcountry Against Dumps v. EPA.48 That case held 
that where a statute clearly establishes a role for tribes, agencies 
                                                                                                         
43 FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW §10.02[1] (2012 ed.). 
44 Id.  
45 Rebecca Tsosie, Tribal Environmental Policy in an Era of Self-
Determination: The Role of Ethics, Economics, and Traditional Ecological 
Knowledge, 21 VT. L. REV. 225, 230 (1996). 
46 Jana Milford, Tribal Authority under the Clean Air Act: How is it Working?, 
44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 213, 219 n.35 (2004).  
47 Id. at 219. 
48 Backcountry against Dumps v. EPA, 100 F.3d 147 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
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cannot allow tribes to assume any other role.49 The result was that 
since the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, which was at 
issue in that case, clearly provided a role for tribes, the EPA could 
not on its own authority prescribe any other roles to tribes.50 This is 
in contrast to statutes like the Toxic Substances Control Act51 and 
the Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act,52 
which do not explicitly assign roles to tribes. For these latter 
statutes, the legislative gap left the way open for the EPA to interpret 
the statutes in ways that allow tribes to be treated as states for the 
implementation of certain programs.53 Therefore, because the 
MMPA explicitly provides a role for tribes through co-management, 
congressional action is needed before agencies can treat tribes as 
states.  
Beginning in the 1980s, Congress enshrined the EPA’s 
regulatory maneuver into law by passing a series of statutory 
amendments to the Clean Air Act (1990),54 Clean Water Act 
(1994),55 Safe Drinking Water Act (1986),56 and the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act (1986).57 
These amendments, all similar in language and structure, create a 
statutory opportunity for recognized Indian tribes to apply to the 
EPA for TAS authority under the various laws. 
 
B. How TAS Works 
TAS provisions typically allow Tribes to qualify for TAS if they 
have a governing body capable of carrying out substantial 
government functions and meeting the specific statutory 
                                                                                                         
49 Id. at 149–51; see also COHEN, supra note 43, §10.02[2]. 
50 The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act defined tribes as municipalities 
and did not provide an opportunity for municipalities to take on the authority 
sought by the tribe. Backcountry, 100 F.3d at 149–50. 
51 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–29 (1976). 
52 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001–05 (1986). 
53 Nance v. EPA, 645 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1981); see COHEN, supra note 43, § 
10.02[2]. 
54 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d)(1)(A) (2016). 
55 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (2014).  
56 24 U.S.C. § 300j-11 (2014). 
57 42 U.S.C. § 9626 (2016); In addition, the Federal Insecticide Rodenticide and 
Fungicide Act has contained such a provision since 1978. 7 U.S.C. § 136u 
(2016). 
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requirements.58 Once a tribe has TAS authority it must seek 
primacy, like states do, from the EPA. If a tribe does not seek 
primacy or if a tribe’s program, in the opinion of the federal agency, 
does not meet federal criteria. then the EPA retains primacy—just 
as it would with state applicants.59 Tribes with TAS authority may 
choose to assume primacy over only a subset of regulatory functions 
if they prefer.60 The governmental roles offered to Tribes by the 
TAS provisions mirror the full spectrum of regulatory roles 
available to states: “from basic monitoring to standard setting and 
from permit issuing to enforcement.”61 
To date, all of the existing TAS provisions effect tribes’ abilities 
to perform certain on-reservation regulatory functions. TAS 
typically applies to lands “within the boundaries of the reservation 
or other areas within the tribe’s jurisdiction.”62 The EPA has also 
determined that TAS applies to other off-reservation lands as long 
as they qualify as Indian Country, meaning for as long as Indian 
groups can assert legal jurisdiction over it. This typically covers 
private lands within the exterior boundaries of the reservation but 
includes lands exterior of the reservation boundaries as well.63 For 
instance, the D.C. Circuit in Arizona Public Service Co. v. EPA 
found that § 7601(d) of the Clean Air Act, which is the TAS 
provision, applies to the management of air resources “within the 
exterior boundaries of the reservation or other areas within the 
[tribe’s] jurisdiction,” even if the land is owned in fee simple by 
non-Indians.64 Similarly, in Oklahoma Tax Commission, the 
Supreme Court defined the term “reservation” to include “trust lands 
that have been validly set apart for the use of a tribe even though the 
                                                                                                         
58 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (2014), 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d)(2) (2016), and 42 
U.S.C. § 300j-11(b) (2014).  
59 See, e.g., Purpose and Scope, 40 C.F.R. § 123.1(h) (2015), Purpose and 
Scope, 40 C.F.R. § 271.1 (2015). 
60 See, e.g., Partial Delegation of Administrative Authority to a Tribe. 40 C.F.R. 
§ 49.122 (2016); see Milford, supra note 46, at 221.  
61 James Grijalva, EPA’s Indian Policy at Twenty-Five, NAT. RESOURCES & 
ENVTL., Summer 2010, at 13. 
62 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d)(2)(B) (2016). 
63 See William C. Scott, The Clean Air Act: “Treatment as States” Rule, March 
26, 2008, available at http://corporate.findlaw.com/law-library/the-clean-air-
act-treatment-as-states-rule.html. 
64 Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co. v. EPA, 211 F.3d 1280, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 2000).  
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land has not been formally designated as a reservation,” in addition 
to the common understanding of the term “reservation.”65 In Village 
of Venetie, the Supreme Court determined that corporate owned 
native land, which makes up the bulk of Native lands in Alaska, did 
not qualify as Indian Country.66 Most Native lands in Alaska are 
owned in fee simple by Native corporations. Therefore, in Alaska, 
tribes do not currently have reservation lands67 and marine mammal 
management would necessarily be an off-reservation, off-shore 
activity anyway.   
The fact that Alaska Natives do not have the territorial 
sovereignty associated with tribes in the continental U.S. is 
irrelevant because the jurisdiction being sought necessarily extends 
beyond the boundaries of tribal lands anyway. Therefore, a TAS 
provision under the MMPA would have to be somewhat different 
from existing TAS provisions and explicitly provide for 
management authority outside of Indian Country. The moral/legal 
authority for TAS lies in the sovereignty of tribes and the fact that 
Indian Country is a trust resource protected by the federal 
government on behalf of tribes. Alaskan tribes also retain their 
inherent sovereignty and marine mammals have likewise been 
recognized as a trust resource protected by the federal government 
on their behalf.68   
Existing TAS provisions come with the possibility of financial 
support to assist tribes in developing capacity and/or carrying out 
                                                                                                         
65 63 Fed. Reg. 7,254, 7,258 (Feb. 12, 1998) (citing Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. 
Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, 498 U.S. 505, 511 (1991)). 
66 Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government, 522 U.S. 520 (1998) 
(holding that lands owned by Alaska Native corporations are not Indian Country 
because they are not permanently set aside for the exclusive use of tribes). 
Similarly, the Clean Water Act defines “Federal Indian Reservation” as all land 
within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United 
State Government.” 33 U.S.C. § 1377(h)(1) (2014).  
67 With the single exception of Annette Island Reserve at Metlakatla, which is 
the only reservation in Alaska, 
68 See Togiak v. United States, 470 F. Supp. 423, 428 (D.D.C. 1979) (construing 
the exemptions for Native Alaskan hunting found in statutes, such as the Marine 
Mammal Protection Act and the Endangered Species Act, as imposing a trust 
responsibility on the federal government to protect Alaskan Natives’ rights to 
subsistence hunting).  
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the functions of the relevant statute.69 As with other TAS provisions, 
financial support would be essential under the MMPA, both to help 
tribes build capacity in order to meet the criteria necessary to be 
treated as a state, and to earn transfer authority for specific 
programs. This type of financial support is not unique to TAS 
agreements; states have also always been eligible to receive 
financial support under the environmental statutes70 and under the 
MMPA.71  
Another challenge is that “tribes do not have criminal authority 
to punish non-Indians who violate tribal, state, or federal laws.”72 
Under Montana v. United States,73 the Supreme Court held that 
tribes cannot enforce tribal rules against non-Indians unless the non-
Indians have entered into consensual agreements with the tribe or 
tribal members, or the conduct in question threatens the tribe’s 
political integrity, economic security, or health and welfare.74 In 
Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co.,75 the 
Supreme Court held that the Montana test was applicable only to 
non-Indian conduct that “imperils the subsistence or welfare of the 
tribe” such that tribal regulation is “necessary to avert catastrophic 
consequences” for tribal self-government. Therefore, the issue of 
enforcement may be a stumbling block to Native management, but 
the problem can be circumvented. 
Under existing TAS provisions, tribes overcome this problem by 
passing on enforcement requests to the EPA, which does the 
                                                                                                         
69 See e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d)(B) (2016) and 33 U.S.C. § 1377(c), (e), (f) 
(2014); see Actions under Section 301(d)(4) Authority, 40 C.F.R. § 49.11(b) 
(2015).  
70 See e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 7405, 7406 (2014). 
71 16 U.S.C.A, § 1379(j) (West 2016).  
72 Rob Roy Smith, At a Complex Crossroads: Animal Law in Indian Country, 14 
ANIMAL L. 109, 112–13 (2007). 
73 Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981). In this case the Crow tribe of 
Montana attempted to regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indians on land 
owned by non-Indians within the boundaries of the reservation.  
74 Id. at 565–66. See also United States v. Mazuvie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975) 
(finding that tribes have regulatory authority over non-Indians if Congress 
delegates that power to them). 
75 Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 341 
(2008). In this case the tribe attempted to regulate the sale of non-Indian lands 
within the external boundaries of the reservation, but the court found that the 
facts did not rise to the level necessary to meet the criteria of the Montana 
exemptions.  
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enforcement on behalf of tribes. Congress and the EPA developed 
clear lines of authority in the area of off-reservation enforcement 
over non-Indians in order to circumvent such enforcement 
problems. The statutory and regulatory provisions recognize tribes’ 
inherent sovereignty to develop air and water quality standards; 
however, it is the EPA that is “the entity that ultimately adopts and 
enforces the standards that apply to non-Indians, and the process 
involves opportunity for public comment and challenge of the tribal 
proposals.”76  
 
III. LEGAL APPROACH #2: TSGA AND TRANSFER OF DOI OFF-
RESERVATION PROGRAMS TO TRIBES 
Tribal self-determination is “the recognition that Tribal 
governments are the fundamental governmental units to implement 
Indian policy.”77 As the Congressional Statement of Findings in the 
TSGA states:  
 
transferring control to tribal governments . . . over 
funding and for Federal programs, services, 
functions, and activities . . . is an effective way to 
implement the Federal policy of government-to-
government relations with Indian Tribes; and 
transferring control to tribal governments . . . 
strengthens the Federal policy of Indian self-
determination.78 
 
A. Brief History of TSGA 
In 1975 Congress passed the Indian Self-Determination and 
Education Assistance Act (ISDEAA).79 This statute attempts to 
stimulate Native American self-governance by encouraging tribes to 
undertake management and implementation of federal Indian 
                                                                                                         
76 Goodman, supra note 8; see also Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co. v. EPA, 211 F.3d 1280, 
1288–89 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d 1135, 1141 (9th Cir. 
1998); Albuquerque v. Brower, 97 F.3d 415, 419 (10th Cir. 1996) (all upholding 
EPA enforcement of tribal standards against non-Indians off-reservation). 
77 Brett Kenney, Tribes as Managers of Federal Natural Resources, 27 NAT. 
RESOURCES & ENVTL., Summer 2012, at 1. 
78 Tribal Self-Governance Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103–413,108 Stat. 4250 
§202(5)(a) (1994). 
79 25 U.S.C.A § 450 (West 2016). 
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programs.80 Federal bureaucracy and paternalism were recognized 
as having eroded tribal self-governance, and the new statute created 
a process through which Indian programs were removed from 
Bureau of Indian Affairs administration and placed in the hands of 
tribal governments.81 This approach explicitly includes federal 
funding to assist tribes in carrying out these functions.82 In 1994, 
ISDEAA was amended by the Tribal Self Governance Act,83 which 
expands the scope of programs which can be transferred to tribal 
governments beyond simply those programs initially administered 
by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, to programs administered by other 
Department of the Interior (DOI) agencies.84  
The MMPA divides management over marine mammal species 
between the Department of Commerce and the Department of the 
Interior, such that the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) Fisheries manages cetaceans and 
pinnipeds other than walrus, and the FWS manages all other marine 
mammals, including: sea otter, walrus, polar bear, dugong, and 
manatee.85  Because of the limitation of TSGA’s application to DOI 
agencies,86 using TSGA to gain greater tribal authority over marine 
mammals will only be relevant to expanded tribal management of 
species currently managed by the FWS.  
 
B. How TSGA Works 
The TSGA creates a process through which management 
authority over DOI off-reservation programs that have “special 
geographic, historical, or cultural significance” to a tribe may be 
transferred to a tribal government.87 This potentially authorizes the 
transfer to tribal management of a wide variety of off-reservation 
programs, and once a program is transferred then funding becomes 
available as well.88 The transfer of federal programs is accomplished 
                                                                                                         
80 25 U.S.C.A. § 450a(b) (West 2016). 
81 See King, supra note 8, at 494–95; see 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 450a, f (West 2016).  
82 25 U.S.C. § 450j-1 (2000). 
83 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 458aa-hh (West 2016). 
84 25 U.S.C. § 458cc(B)(2) (2006).  
85 16 U.S.C. § 1362(12)(A) (2003). 
86 25 U.S.C. § 458cc(b)(2) (2006). 
87 25 U.S.C. § 458cc(c) (2006). 
88 Kenney, supra note 77. 
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through negotiated Annual Funding Agreements which transfer both 
authority over a program and the funding necessary to administer 
the program to the tribal government.89 Because this tool applies to 
off-reservation programs, the existence of “Indian Country” is 
unnecessary and Alaska Native Tribes may participate.  
To be eligible for program management under the TSGA, tribes 
must complete a planning phase, request participation by official 
resolution or action by a tribal governing body, and demonstrate at 
least three years of fiscal stability.90 Tribes can then petition for 
management of entire programs or only portions of programs.91 This 
flexibility may suit Alaskan Tribes that do not wish to assume 
authority over the entire MMPA program, or even all management 
functions for a single species, but do want greater authority over 
programs like harvest administration or habitat management. Under 
the TSGA, tribes are allowed to come together as consortia to take 
over a DOI program.92 Existing tribal consortia like IPCoMM, the 
Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission, and others may already be 
well positioned to take advantage of this opportunity.93  
Each DOI agency retains discretion over whether to transfer the 
requested program to the relevant tribe.94 The TSGA prohibits the 
transfer to tribes of “inherently federal functions,”95 and the question 
of which functions are “inherently federal” is left open for the DOI 
to answer.96 In 2010, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
published a policy letter defining “inherently governmental 
function” and the definition’s application to all federal agencies.97 
The definition adopted by OMB states that the term “means a 
function that is so intimately related to the public interest as to 
require performance by Federal [g]overnment employees.”98 
                                                                                                         
89 King, supra note 8, at 478; 25 U.S.C. §§ 458cc(b)(2), (g) (2006).  
90 25 U.S.C. § 458bb(c) (1996). 
91 25 U.S.C. § 458cc (2006); see also King, supra note 8, at 501.  
92 25 U.S.C. § 458cc(c) (2006).  
93 The Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission currently manages bowhead 
whaling by Alaska Natives in ten Arctic villages. Ristroph, supra note 11, at 73.  
94 Kenney, supra note 77, at 48. 
95 25 U.S.C. § 458cc(k) (2006). 
96 King, supra note 8, 502. 
97 Work Reserved for Performance by Federal Government Employees, 75 Fed. 
Reg. 16,188 (Mar. 31, 2010). 
98 Work Reserved for Performance by Federal Government Employees, 
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Ultimately, a great deal of discretion is left in the hands of the 
agencies to determine whether a program is inherently a federal 
function or not, and it is not clear how the FWS might interpret a 
petition to manage all or some programs under the MMPA. As King 
writes, the agencies “are obligated to negotiate, but not to come to 
an agreement.”99 However, since the MMPA itself contemplates 
delegating this very same authority to states, it seems unlikely that 
these functions could be described as “inherently federal” so as to 
exclude the possibility of tribal control.   
Like the TAS arrangement, enforcement of tribal rules over non-
tribal members, especially off-reservation, could be a problem for 
TSGA implementation. However, enforcement over non-Indians 
could simply be left to the federal agency since tribes may request 
authority over only certain aspects of programs if they choose. 
Finally, the TSGA allows the Secretary to retract programs that have 
been delegated to tribes where there is “imminent jeopardy to a 
physical trust asset, natural resources, or public health and 
safety.”100 
 The federal government’s policy has been to encourage tribal 
self-governance in areas pertaining to tribal members’ health and 
welfare.101 However, tribes are not given the opportunity for equal 
status to that of states under the MMPA; they are essentially being 
treated as though they are not the separate sovereign entities they are 
known to be.102 For many tribes in Alaska, the fluctuation of marine 
mammal populations impacts the economic security, health, and 
welfare of the tribe, and tribal governments may be the best able to 
anticipate and mitigate those impacts.  
 
                                                                                                         
75 Fed. Reg. at 16,193 (the definition also providing a non-exclusive list of 
examples of inherently governmental functions, none of which provide a 
definitive answer with regard to the types of delegation of authority that might 
be sought under the MMPA). 
99 King, supra note 8, at 505. 
100 25 U.S.C.A. § 458cc(d) (West 2014). 
101 Courtney A. Stouff, Native Americans and Homeland Security: Failure of the 
Homeland Security Act to Recognize Tribal Sovereignty, 108 PENN. ST. L. REV. 
375, 394 (2003) (arguing that the Homeland Security Act of 2002 should 
similarly be amended to include TAS provisions to protect tribal sovereignty).  
102 See CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 8, at 369.  
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IV. COMBINING FRAMEWORK OF TSGA WITH THE TRIBAL SELF-
GOVERNANCE INTENTIONS OF TAS COULD LEAD TO A BETTER 
OVERALL SOLUTION 
Congressional action combining the underlying principles of the 
TSGA with the more practical framework of the TAS provisions 
could provide a good model for the MMPA. Congressional action is 
preferable because it provides needed legitimation, moral 
leadership, and specific statutory authority.103  
There are several obstacles in the way of applying either the TAS 
or TSGA approaches individually, as they currently exist, to the 
MMPA. First, the TAS provisions have so far only been applicable 
to on-reservation functions. On the other hand, the TSGA has 
already been expressly applied to tribal management off-
reservation, which seems to be more applicable to the MMPA 
context. The downside of the TSGA approach is that it only creates 
the opportunity for management authority over programs designated 
as eligible (not inherently federal) by the agency in charge; 
therefore, certain programs or functions can be excluded from tribal 
management at the agency’s discretion. TAS provides unequivocal 
authority for tribes to assume authority over certain federal 
programs if the tribes meet basic federal requirements. This provides 
a certainty that is not available under the TSGA. Additionally, the 
TSGA provisions only apply to DOI agencies. MMPA management 
is divided between the FWS (DOI) and NOAA (Department of 
Commerce), with certain marine mammal species being assigned to 
each agency. Therefore, only a few species would even be eligible 
for tribal management under the TSGA.  
On the other hand, it should be relatively easy to integrate the 
two approaches. Both the TSGA and TAS104 provisions can be 
applied to tribal consortiums, and both TAS and TSGA resolve 
many difficulties in similar ways. For instance, under both scenarios 
enforcement over non-Indians can be left to the federal agency. 
Additionally, both approaches retain strict federal oversight so that 
programs can be withdrawn from tribal management if statutory 
requirements are not being met. Therefore, the two programs, 
                                                                                                         
103 Goodman, supra note 8, at 360.  
104 EPA Review of Tribal Clean Air Act Applications, 40 C.F.R. § 49.9(f) 
(2015). 
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though they contain several significant differences, are very 
compatible.  
For various reasons, tribes have been slower than anticipated in 
taking up the opportunity presented by the TAS amendments. To 
counter that slow response, the EPA has now established an 
additional program that allows tribes to use EPA’s own federal 
implementation of pollution laws. This does not require TAS status 
or tribal program development. Instead, tribes may take over the 
EPA’s own implementation including “setting standards, issuing 
permits, and regulating underground injections” under the Clean 
Water Act and hazardous waste management under the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act.105 This is a non-DOI agency taking 
an approach through regulation that is remarkably similar to the one 
found in the TSGA. Co-management, as it currently exists, has so 
far proved insufficient to meet the tribes’ purposes. If Congress 
combines the most applicable aspects of both the TSGA and the 
TAS approaches, an MMPA amendment could be fashioned that 
creates meaningful opportunity for management transfer to Tribes 
under the MMPA, one that mimics what states have already been 
offered.  
It is not unprecedented for the federal government to delegate 
off-reservation wildlife management authority to tribes. One 
prominent example is that of the Nez Perce taking over state-wide 
management authority of the gray wolf beginning in 1996.106 This 
was possible because the federal government’s more obvious 
partner, the State of Idaho, passed a series of laws and approved 
several wolf management plans that explicitly conflicted with 
federal objectives. These actions made it impossible for the State to 
cooperate with the federal government on the matter.107 This 
                                                                                                         
105 Grijalva, supra note 61, at 16. 
106 A second, more recent, example is the Kootenai Tribe of northern Idaho 
which the Fish and Wildlife Service recently announced will be given authority 
to create an updated recovery plan for the endangered Selkirk Caribou herd. 
Reuters, Tribe Takes Lead in Saving Reindeer Herd in Rocky Mountains, NY 
TIMES (Aug. 29, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/30/us/tribe-takes-
lead-in-saving-reindeer-herd-in-rocky-mountains.html?_r=0.  
107 See Patrick Impero Wilson, Wolves, Politics, and the Nez Perce: Wolf 
Recovery in Central Idaho and Therole of Native Tribes, 39 NAT. RESOURCES J. 
543 (1999) (detailing full account of this history).  
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Alaskan tribes may not currently have the capacity to meet the 
management requirements necessary for transfer of authority under 
the MMPA, regardless of the legal mechanism employed. However, 
there is nothing to preclude them from developing and ultimately 
exercising such capacity. The EPA and Congress have built funding 
for capacity building into the TAS program, and funding has also 
long been contemplated in the TSGA program as well. The MMPA 
itself contemplates providing funding to states to assist them in 
developing and administering marine mammal management 
programs.108 Any approach attempted on behalf of tribes under the 
MMPA should do likewise.  
Alaska Native tribes, like states, are sovereign entities. 
Furthermore, tribes have important historic, cultural, economic, and 
sustenance ties to marine mammals and marine resources. The 
federal government has many times reiterated its position that 
Native sovereignty must be respected and Native self-governance 
encouraged. Additionally, Congress explicitly intended MMPA 
management authority to devolve to a more local level of 
government. Expanding the scope of Native authority under the 
MMPA is the next logical step in reaching these federal objectives. 
                                                                                                         
108 16 U.S.C.A § 1379(j) (West 2016). 
